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Abstract
In this paper, we formulate and solve a New Keynesian model with monetary and s-
cal policy rules whose coecients are time-varying and interdependent. We implement
time variation in the policy rules by specifying coecients that are logistic functions of
correlated latent factors and propose a solution method that allows for these character-
istics. The paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate the policy rules with time-varying
coecients, endogeneity, and stochastic volatility in a limited-information framework.
Results show that monetary policy switches regime more frequently than scal policy,
and that there is a non-negligible degree of interdependence between policies. Policy
experiments reveal that contractionary monetary policy lowers ination in the short
run and increases it in the long run. Also, lump-sum taxes aect output and ination,
as the literature on the scal theory of the price level suggests, but the eects are
attenuated with respect to a pure scal regime.
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1 Introduction
The great recession has raised awareness of the role of monetary-scal policy interactions
in determining the behavior of economic aggregates. In the United States, for example,
reductions in discount and funds rates and even unconventional quantitative easing measures
have accompanied scal stimulus policies. Moreover, given the high projected scal liabilities
in developed as well as in some developing countries, interactions are likely to gure more
prominently in determining economic outcomes over the coming decades.
The considerations behind monetary-scal policy interactions have been part of the mon-
etary and scal policymaking literature for a long time. Friedman (1948) proposed a scheme
of monetary-scal policy interactions to deliver stability in cyclical uctuations. The seminal
work of Sargent and Wallace (1981) provides a formal investigation that illustrates how mon-
etary and scal policies interact to determine ination. The authors show that under scal
dominance |where a partial monetization of government debt is necessary to avoid default|
the ability of the monetary authority to control ination disappears. Leeper (1991) exam-
ined monetary-scal policy interactions within the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) framework. The work of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2010) surveys the positive
and normative aspects of monetary-scal policy interactions in the existing literature.
Conventionally, there have been two approaches to how each of the policy authorities
responds to deviations of its variables of interest from target. One approach species a central
bank that follows a Taylor (1993) rule under which the nominal interest rate increases more
than proportionally when ination increases. Thus, monetary policy provides the nominal
anchor to deliver price-level determinacy. In this approach, the scal authority follows a
rule under which (lump-sum) taxes stabilize debt. This rst approach has been referred to
as monetary dominance (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2000). We will call it a monetary (M)
regime.
The other approach postulates that the scal authority does not adjust taxes to stabilize
debt. In this case, the central bank cannot stabilize the price level. Thus, scal policy
provides the nominal anchor for price-level determinacy through expectations about future
surpluses, given a level of outstanding nominal liabilities (see Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994;
Woodford, 1994, 1995, 1996; Cochrane, 1998, 2005, 2001). This approach has been referred
to as the scal theory of the price level. We will call it a scal (F) regime.
When the two approaches are considered together, there are four possible combinations
of monetary and scal policy stances that have been referred to as monetary-scal policy
interactions. The four combinations are: (i) an M regime; (ii) an F regime; (iii) a regime
where no authority provides the nominal anchor and the price level is indeterminate; (iv) a
regime where both authorities try to provide the nominal anchor and debt is unbounded.
This paper formulates and solves a New Keynesian model that incorporates monetary
and scal policy rules whose coecients are time-varying and interdependent. Time vari-
ation and interdependence allow for co-movements in monetary and scal policymaking,
thereby introducing a direct channel of interactions. This channel inuences expectations
about future monetary and scal policymaking, aecting the dynamics of the variables in
equilibrium. In particular, we show that when there are co-movements in monetary and
scal policymaking in the direction of stable and determinate equilibria |the M and F
regimes| the volatilities of output and ination are reduced, compared to the case where
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co-movements in that direction are absent.
As Davig and Leeper (2007) emphasize, policymaking is a complicated process of ana-
lyzing and interpreting data, receiving advice, and applying judgment. During some periods
policymakers may give more attention to ination or debt stabilization, while in other periods
they may give more attention to output stabilization. Furthermore, a substantial empirical
literature argues that policy rules have not remained invariant over the past six decades (see
Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000; Favero and Monacelli, 2003; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004;
Davig and Leeper, 2006; Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron and Rubio-Ramirez, 2010; Bianchi,
2012). In this paper, policy rule coecients move across regimes as functions of exogenous
latent factors. In particular, the policy rule coecients are logistic functions of these latent
factors. The logistic function allows the policy rule coecients to move between two regimes
|as with a two-state Markov-switching specication| with a smooth transition between
regimes. We assume that one latent factor inuences the evolution of the coecients of
the monetary policy rule and that a dierent latent factor inuences the evolution of the
coecients of the scal policy rule.
We introduce interdependence between monetary and scal policy by allowing correlation
between the two latent factors driving the evolution of the monetary and the scal policy
rule coecients. This correlation can be seen as coordination |explicit or implicit| in
policymaking. The correlation between the latent factors allows policy interactions through
co-movements in the evolution of the policy rule coecients.
Given the logistic specication of the policy rule coecients and the existence of la-
tent factors as additional states, the model is intrinsically nonlinear. We devise a solution
method that takes into consideration these nonlinearities. The solution method incorporates
agents' expectations on the joint evolution of the policy rule coecients. This makes the
model appropriate to analyze the impacts of monetary and scal policies in a framework of
interactions.
We employ a limited-information analysis to estimate the policy rule coecients using
Bayesian methods appropriate for nonlinear state-state models. The results indicate that
the policy rule coecients are far from constant. In particular, the monetary policy rule
coecient on ination switches more frequently than the scal policy rule coecient on
debt. There is also a degree of policy interdependence: scal policy that focuses on keeping
debt under control tends to accompany monetary policy that focuses on keeping ination
under control, and monetary policy that does not increase interest rates actively tends to
accompany scal policy that does not pay attention to debt increases.
Finally, we calibrate the model to carry out policy analysis. The policy experiments
show that contractionary monetary policy can lower ination, at least in the short-run. The
experiments also show that (lump-sum) taxes have eects on output and ination, as the
literature on the scal theory of the price level suggests, but the eects are attenuated with
respect to a pure scal regime.
2 Interactions Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy
In this section, we introduce the concept of interdependence in policymaking that will be
central to the analysis of the subsequent sections. We describe the theoretical framework of
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monetary-scal policy interactions and the empirical ndings in the literature with respect
to policy interactions. Then, we present how we implement interdependence in policymaking
through interdependence of the policy rule coecients.
The theoretical framework of monetary-scal policy interactions in a DSGE model was
rst introduced by Leeper (1991), who shows how dierent combinations of the magnitudes of
monetary and scal policy rule coecients lead to dierent equilibrium outcomes and local
dynamics. Leeper coins the terms \active" and \passive" monetary and scal policies to
describe how the central bank adjusts interest rates with respect to ination deviations from
target, and how scal policy adjusts taxes to changes in public debt. A change more than
proportional in nominal interest rates with respect to ination deviations from target is called
\active" monetary policy, while a Ricardian view of scal policy, where taxes adjust enough
to cover interest payments and to retire debt, is called \passive" scal policy. The alternative
scenarios with respect to monetary and scal policies are called \passive" monetary policy
and \active" scal policy.1 Leeper nds that the model delivers a bounded unique rational
expectations equilibrium as long as monetary policy is active and scal policy is passive
|regime M| or if monetary policy is passive and scal policy is active |regime F. Also,
the model delivers indeterminacy if both monetary policy and scal policy are passive, and
no bounded solution if both are active. Other papers along this line are Sims (1994) and
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).
Davig and Leeper (2006) estimate Markov-switching models of monetary and scal policy
rules with U.S. data. Their results show that there have been numerous switches in monetary
and scal policy rule coecients. In particular, whenever the interest rate rule pays more
(less) attention to ination deviations, less (more) weight is given to output deviations. Also,
when the tax rule pays more (less) attention to debt deviations, more (less) weight is given to
output deviations |in line with an automatic stabilizers argument. These switches deliver
the four regimes of policy interactions described above.
Bianchi (2012) conducts a full-information estimation of a Markov-switching DSGE
model with policy rule coecients that switch among three states. The results show that an
M regime was in place starting in the 1990s, that an F regime was in place during the 1970s
and that a no-bounded-solution regime was in place during the 1980s.
We explicitly introduce co-movements between the coecients of the monetary and the
scal policy rules. This setup generalizes the Markov-switching setup in Davig and Leeper
(2006) and Bianchi (2012) by introducing interdependence in the evolution of the policy
rule coecients. With this addition, the model allows for a direct channel of interactions
in policymaking, so that agents form expectations accordingly, not only in terms of the
individual future evolution of policy rule coecients, but as a framework of joint future
policymaking. Below we specify the policy rules, the time variability characteristic of their
coecients, and the way in which we introduce policymaking interdependence.
1Any positive response of taxes to debt constitutes a passive scal policy. If one only wants to consider
equilibria with bounded real debt, then real taxes have to respond to real debt deviations with increases
higher than the real interest rate.
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2.1 Policy Rules
We specify policy rules with coecients that are time varying. The time-varying coe-
cients of a particular policy rule are logistic functions of a latent state. More specically, if
%t is a time-varying coecient of a policy rule, it has the following functional form:
%t  %(zt)
= %0 +
%1
1 + exp ( %2(zt   %3)) ;
where zt = zzt 1 + t is a latent factor, 0  z  1 and t  iidN(0; 1).
Under this specication, %0 denotes the lower (upper) bound of %t, while %0 + %1 denotes
its upper (lower) bound (if %1 < 0). %2 > 0 is a transition coecient aecting the speed
of the transition between the lower and the upper bounds, and %3 is a location parameter
determining the value of zt at which %t crosses the y-axis. A graph for %(zt) with %0 = 0:01,
%1 = 0:1, %2 = 1, and %3 = 0 is reproduced in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Logistic Function
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Two approaches have been proposed in the empirical literature to model time-varying
policy rule coecients. One is a Markov-switching specication with nite number of states
(see Davig and Leeper, 2006; Eo, 2009; Davig and Doh, 2009; Bianchi, 2012). The second
is a random-coecient specication (see Kim and Nelson, 2006a; Boivin, 2006; Fernandez-
Villaverde et al., 2010). Yksel et al. (2013) oers a survey of the literature on estimation of
Taylor rules with time-varying coecients. An advantage of the Markov-switching specica-
tion is that it implies bounded coecients, which could be important in terms of determinacy
and relevance of the equilibrium. With respect to the random-coecient specication, an
advantage is that it implies smooth transitions between states. The logistic specication
proposed in this paper generalizes the two approaches: On one hand it allows a policy rule
coecient to switch smoothly from one regime to another, while on the other it allows for a
bounded evolution of the coecient.2
The latent factors can be seen as representing a combination of political and institutional
determinants of policymaking. We assume that the latent factors are exogenous with respect
to the variables in the model, and that the information that they provide is part of the
2The Markov-switching specication is a particular case of the logistic specication, when %2 !1.
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information set of the agents. That is, agents and policymakers share the same information
set. This assumption is needed to solve the model, as will be seen.
2.1.1 Monetary Policy Rule
Monetary policy takes place by means of an interest rate feedback rule of the form
Rt = R
R
t 1 R
(1 R)
t exp ("
R
t );
where R 2 (0; 1) indicates the degree of interest rate smoothing, and "Rt  iidN(0; 2R) is a
monetary policy shock. Rt is the target short-term nominal interest rate. The central bank
sets the interest rate to react to deviations of ination from target and to the output gap
according to
Rt = R

t

(zmt ) Yt
Y t
y(zmt )
;
where t = Pt=Pt 1 is the gross ination rate, Yt is output, Y t is output in the absence of
price rigidities, and R is the steady state nominal interest rate, which is guaranteed to be
state independent if the target ination rate, , is set equal to , the steady state ination.3
The time varying monetary policy rule coecients are denoted by (zmt ) for ination
deviations from steady state, and y(zmt ) for the output gap. Both are logistic functions of
the monetary policy latent factor, zmt .
2.1.2 Fiscal Policy Rule
The scal rule is a feedback rule for the ratio of lump-sum taxes net of transfers to output,
t = Tt=Yt, of the form
t = 

t 1
(1  )
t exp ("

t );
where  2 (0; 1) indicates the degree of tax rate smoothing, and "t  iidN(0; 2 ) is a scal
policy shock. t is the target level of the ratio of taxes net of transfers to output. The scal
authority sets lump-sum taxes to respond to debt deviations and the output gap according
to
t = 

bt 1
b
b(zft ) Yt
Y t
y(zft )
;
where bt = Bt=(PtYt) denotes the debt-to-output ratio in period t, and b is its target level.
 denotes the steady state level of t, which is guaranteed to be state independent in the
steady state equilibrium if b is set equal to its steady state value, denoted by b.
The time-varying scal policy rule coecients are b(zft ) for debt deviations from steady
state and y(zft ) for the output gap. All are logistic functions of the scal policy latent
factor, zft .
3The target ination rate is constant to allow the linearization of the model around the steady state
conditional on a realization of the latent factor at each period.
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2.2 Interdependence in Policymaking
To incorporate direct interactions between policies, we specify the latent factors driving
the evolution of the monetary and scal policy rule coecients as follows:
zmt = zmz
m
t 1 + 
m
t ; (1)
zft = zf z

t 1 + 
f
t ; (2)
where mt and 
f
t are normally distributed with zero mean, unit variance and corr(
m
t ; 
f
t ) = .
Notice that under this specication, if  is dierent from zero, there exist explicit interactions
or interdependent changes between monetary and scal policymaking.
In this context, policy authorities react more or less strongly to deviations of their feed-
back variables from target |ination and the output gap for the monetary authority, and
debt and the output gap for the scal authority| depending on the values of the policy
rule coecients as driven by the evolution of the latent factors, zmt and z
f
t . These latent
factors, ultimately, are going to determine the nature of the possible combinations between
monetary and scal policymaking. The full specication of the monetary and scal policy
rule coecients is as follows:
(zmt ) = 

0 +
1
1 + exp( 2 (zmt   3 ))
; (3)
y(zmt ) = 
y
0 +
y1
1 + exp( y2(zmt   y3))
; (4)
b(zft ) = 
b
0 +
b1
1 + exp( b2(zft   b3))
; (5)
y(zft ) = 
y
0 +
y1
1 + exp( y2 (zft   y3 ))
: (6)
A constant-coecient version of this model delivers an M Regime when  and b are
suciently high |that is, when the monetary authority reacts strongly to ination deviations
and the scal authority reacts strongly to debt deviations. The model delivers an F regime
when  and b are suciently low |that is, when the scal authority reacts weakly to debt
deviations and the monetary authority reacts weakly to ination deviations. With time-
varying coecients, we can choose values of the parameters dening each of the policy rule
coecients (3)-(6) in a way that the model delivers determinate equilibria in the long-run
with short-run deviations from these equilibria.
The interactions with long-run determinacy of the equilibria are only well dened if   0.
In that case, at a given point in time, a high value of (zmt ) |given by a high value of z
m
t |
is likely to be associated with a high value of b(zft ) |given by a high value of z
f
t . Also, at
a given point in time, a low value of (zmt ) |given by a low value of z
m
t | is likely to be
associated with a low value of b(zft ) |given by a low value of z
f
t . Then,  > 0 tends to
send the economy towards the M and F regimes.  = 0 is the case present in the existing
literature, where interactions depend on the values of the policy rule coecients.
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3 The Model
The economy is populated by a representative household, a nal-goods-producing rm,
a continuum of intermediate-goods-producing rms, a monetary authority and a scal au-
thority. The model extends the setup in An and Schorfheide (2007) to incorporate a scal
policy rule and time-varying policy rule coecients. Appendix A details the derivations.
3.1 Households
The representative household derives utility from consumption, Ct,
4 relative to a habit
stock, At, that is given by the level of technology of the economy, and real money balances,
Mt=Pt; and derives disutility from working hours, Ht. Hence, a representative household
chooses consumption, real balances, bond holdings and working hours to maximize
E0
1X
t=0
t

(Ct=At)
1 
1   + M log (Mt=Pt)  H
H1+'t
1 + '

;
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor,  > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, ' > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and M > 0 and
H > 0 are constants that determine the steady state level of real money balances and hours
worked. The household saves in the form of nominal government bonds, Bt, that pay a gross
interest rate Rt each period, and by accumulating money balances that do not pay interests.
It supplies labor services to the rms taking the nominal wage, Wt, as given; it also receives
its aggregate share on the rms' nominal prots, Dt, and pays lump-sum taxes, Tt. Thus,
the household's budget constraint is expressed as
PtCt +Mt +Bt + PtTt  HtWt +Dt +Mt 1 +Rt 1Bt 1 for t  0;
given the initial value of nominal assetsM 1+R 1B 1, and where the transversality condition
that rules out Ponzi schemes holds.
3.2 Firms
There are two types of producers: perfectly competitive nal goods producers and a
continuum of monopolistic intermediate goods producers.
3.2.1 Final Goods Producers
Given the composite good price, Pt, and intermediate goods prices, Pt(j), for j 2 [0; 1],
producers assemble the intermediate goods, Yt(j), to obtain a composite nal good, Yt,
4Ct is a composite consumption good given by Ct =
R 1
0
Ct(j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
and   1. The household
chooses Ct(j) to minimize expenditure on the continuum of goods indexed by j 2 [0; 1] which yields j's
good demand as Ct(j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 
Ct, where Pt is the nal good price at t and Pt(j) is the price of the
consumption good indexed by j.
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according to a CES technology, so that
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt(j)
t 1
t dj
 t
t 1
; (7)
where t 2 [0; 1] is the (time varying) price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.
Here t represents a markup, or cost-push, shock in the Phillips curve relationship. This
cost-push shock follows the autoregresive process
log t = (1  ) log  +  log t 1 + "t ;
with  2 (0; 1),  > 1 and "t  iid N(0; 2).
Final good producers choose the demand of intermediate goods, Yt(j), to maximize prots
given by
PtYt  
Z 1
0
Pt(j)Yt(j)dj:
Optimization yields the demand function of intermediate good j,
Yt(j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 t
Yt: (8)
Combining (8) and (7) yields the expression of the nal good price
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(j)
(1 t)dj
 1
1 t
:
3.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate goods rms produce type j good according to the linear technology
Yt(j) = AtLt(j); (9)
where Lt(j) are hours of work employed by the producer of intermediate good j, and At is
an exogenous technology shock identical across producers following the stochastic process
At = At 1 exp(t);
where  is a trend, and t is a stochastic component following the process
t = t 1 + "t ;
with  2 (0; 1) and "t  iid N(0; 2).
Intermediate good producers face an explicit cost of adjusting their price, measured in
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units of the nished good, and given by

2

Pt(j)
Pt 1(j)
  1
2
Yt;
where   0 measures the magnitude of the price adjustment cost, and  is the steady state
gross ination rate associated with the nal good.
Producers in the intermediate goods sector take wages as given and behave as monop-
olistic competitors in their goods market, choosing the price for their product taking the
demand in (8) as given. Hence, rm j chooses its labor input, Lt(j), and its price, Pt(j), to
maximize
E0
1X
t=0
MRS0;t
"
Pt(j)
Pt
Yt(j)  Wt
Pt
Lt(j)  
2

Pt(j)
Pt 1(j)
  1
2
Yt
#
; (10)
where MRS0;t is the household's marginal rate of substitution between periods 0 and t,
which is given exogenously to the rm. Notice that rm j's nominal labor cost is given by
WtYt(j)=At, and its real marginal labor cost is given by  t = Wt=PtAt, which is the same
across rms in the intermediate goods sector.
3.3 Government
The government nances purchases of goods, Gt, with a combination of lump-sum taxes,
Tt, and money creation,Mt Mt 1, so that the implied process for nominal debt, Bt, satises
the budget constraint:
Bt +Mt + PtTt = PtGt +Mt 1 +Rt 1Bt 1 for t  0; (11)
given M 1 +R 1B 1. Each period, the government demand of the nal good is given by
Gt = tYt;
where t 2 (0; 1) is an exogenous process dened by the transformation gt = 1=(1  t) with
ln gt = (1  g) ln g + g ln gt 1 + "gt ;
where g 2 (0; 1), g = 1=(1  ) with  being the steady state ratio of government spending
to output, and "gt  iid N(0; 2g).
3.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all the intermediate-goods-producing rms make identical
decisions, the money supply equals money demand, labor supply equals labor demand, and
the net supply of government bonds is zero. Hence, the equilibrium conditions for t  0 are
9
given by
Yt = Ct +Gt +

2

t

  1
2
Yt; (12)
0 = 1  t + t t   

t

  1

t

+
+Et

Ct=At
Ct+1=At+1

Yt+1=At+1
Yt=At

t+1

  1

t+1

(13)
1 = RtEt

Ct=At
Ct+1=At+1

At
At+1
1
t+1
; (14)
Wt
Pt
= HL
'
t At

Ct
At

; (15)
Mt
Pt
= MAt

Ct
At
 
Rt
Rt   1

; (16)
with B 1; R 1 > 0; A 1 > 0 and M 1 > 0 given. The symmetric equilibrium is comple-
mented with the monetary and scal policy rules, and the exogenous processes for Gt; t,
and At.
3.5 Frictionless Equilibrium
The frictionless equilibrium is given by the above equilibrium with no frictions ( = 0).
Aggregate output in the frictionless equilibrium is given by
Y t = At
 
t 1
t
H
!1=(+')
g
=(+')
t : (17)
The above is the potential output over which the output gap in the monetary and scal
policy rules is dened.
3.6 Steady-State Equilibrium
Since technology, At, is a non-stationary process, it introduces a stochastic trend in
output, consumption, real money balances, and the real wage. We dene the stationary
variables as: yt = Yt=At; ct = Ct=At; wt = Wt=(AtPt) and vt = Yt=(Mt=Pt). The steady-state
equilibrium is the stationary equilibrium in the absence of shocks, and is dened by the
following equations:
 =
R

; (18)
y =
 
 1

H
!1=(+')
g=(+') = y; (19)
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c =
 
 1

H
!1=(+')
g'=(+'); (20)
1
v
= My
( 1)g 

R
R  1

; (21)
b =


   1

1  1
g
     1
v

1  1

1


; (22)
where b is the steady state level of the debt-to-output ratio, Bt=(PtYt).
3.7 Log-linearized Model and Solution Method
Given that the coecients of the policy rules are time varying, and the time variation
depends on the latent factors, the log-linearization is performed conditioning on the latent
factors being at their current values each period. That is the essence of the quasi-linearity
of the model. We present the model in log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state,
and show a way to solve it using a method in line with the minimum state variable (MSV)
solution approach (McCallum, 1983).
Conditioning on a value of the latent factors at period t, zmt and z
f
t , the log-linearized
equations characterizing the economy in equilibrium are (x^t = ln(xt=x) denotes the log-
deviation of variable xt relative to its non-stochastic steady state, x):
y^t = Ety^t+1   1

(R^t   Et^t+1) + (1  g)g^t + 

^t (23)
^t = Et^t+1 +
(   1)('+ )

(y^t   y^t ) (24)
v^t = (1  )y^t + g^t +

1
R  1

R^t (25)
b^t =
1
bg
g^t   
b
^t +
1
bv
v^t   1
bv
v^t 1  

1
bv
+
1


(^t +Y^t) +
1

(R^t 1 + b^t 1) (26)
y^t =
1
('+ )(   1) ^t +

'+ 
g^t (27)
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R)

(zmt )^t + 
y(zmt ) (y^t   y^t )

+ "Rt (28)
^t =  ^t 1 + (1   )

b(zft )b^t 1 + 
y(zft ) (y^t   y^t )

+ "t ; (29)
where Y^t = y^t   y^t 1 + ^t. The exogenous shocks that complete the equilibrium are the
government spending shock, the cost-push shock, and the technology shock, given by
g^t = gg^t 1 + "
g
t (30)
^t = ^t 1 + "t (31)
^t =  ^t 1 + "t : (32)
To solve the model, let !t = [y^t; ^t]
0, kt = [v^t; b^t; R^t; ^t;Y^t; yt 1; y^t ]
0, ut = [g^t; ^t; ^t; "Rt ; "

t ]
0,
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"t = ["
g
t ; "

t ; "

t ; "
R
t ; "

t ]
0, zt = [zmt ; z
f
t ]
0 and rewrite (23)-(32) as
0 = A(zt)kt +B(z
f
t )kt 1 +C(zt)!t +Dut (33)
0 = Gkt + JEt!t+1 +K!t +Mut (34)
ut+1 = Nut + "t+1; (35)
where A;B(zft );C(zt);D;G;J;K;M and N are appropriate coecient matrices shown in
Appendix B.
The proposed solution is given by
kt = P(zt)kt 1 +Q(zt)ut; (36)
!t = R(zt)kt 1 + S(zt)ut; (37)
where, for F(zt) = fP(zt);Q(zt);R(zt);S(zt)g, the i; j   th entry is given by
F (zt) = F0 + F1
1
1+exp ( F2m(zmt  F3m))
1
1+exp ( F2f(zft  F3f))
1  F4 exp ( F2m(z
m
t  F3m))
1+exp ( F2m(zmt  F3m))
exp ( F2f(zft  F3f))
1+exp ( F2f(zft  F3f))
; (38)
with F4 2 [0; 1]. This functional form is known as a bivariate logistic function and was
introduced by Ali et al. (1978).5 The parameter F4 allows the model to capture the eect
that the dependence between latent factors has on the expectations formations of the agents
about the future evolution of the coecients of the solution. Appendix C illustrates the
procedure to obtain the parameters of the bivariate logistic functions based on the coecients
of the structural model.
We solve the model using an undetermined coecients method approach where not only
the solution has to be guessed and veried, but also the functional form of the coecients of
the solution. Within the logistic specication of policy rules, the bivariate logistic function
(38) satises this last requirement. Appendix E shows that the coecients of the solution
indeed follow a bivariate logistic function.
3.8 On Existence, Stability and Uniqueness of the Solution
Existence of the solution is guaranteed by using the undetermined coecients method.
Time-varying coecients pose a diculty at guaranteeing stability and/or uniqueness of the
solution, in particular if one thinks of stability and/or uniqueness holding in each period
of time. The method presented nds a solution that is based on the values of the time-
varying policy rule coecients at their limits, or long-run bounds. These limiting coecient
values are chosen to deliver stability and uniqueness of the solution in a constant-coecient
version of the model, oering well-dened bounds between which the economy evolves and
between which agents form expectations. Davig and Leeper (2007) and Farmer et al. (2008)
emphasize that stability and uniqueness of Markov-switching rational expectations models
5For identication of the latent factors and the coecients of the policy rules in a estimation setting it
is necessary to impose that F2m > 0 and F2f > 0.
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have to be discussed within a framework of how agents form expectations about the future
evolution of policy rule coecients, and that is the approach taken at deriving the solution
of the model in this paper. Here, we take expectations to the realization of future policy
rule coecients as given by realization of logistic functions of the latent factors.6
4 Estimation Strategy
This section presents the estimation of the policy rules with time-varying coecients
driven by latent factors as specied for the New Keynesian model presented in Section 3.
The estimation employs a limited-information estimation approach using Bayesian methods,
which allows obtaining the set of parameters characterizing the policy rules, denoted by y,
the set of parameters of the latent factors, denoted by z, and the latent factors themselves.
4.1 Time-varying Coecients, Stochastic Volatility and Endogene-
ity
Let INTt denote the demeaned nominal federal funds rate in period t, TAXt the demeaned
ratio of federal receipts net of transfers to output in period t, INFt the demeaned annual
ination rate in period t, GAPt the output gap in period t and DBTt the demeaned average
debt to output ratio over the last four quarters. The state-space model is composed of the
observation equations
INTt = RINTt 1 + (1  R) ((zmt )INFt + y(zmt )GAPt) + Rt (39)
TAXt = TAXt 1 + (1   )

b(zft )DBTt + 
y(zft )GAPt

+ t ; (40)
and the transition equations
zmt = zmz
m
t 1 + 
m
t (41)
zft = zf z

t 1 + 
f
t : (42)
Assumptions about the distributions of Rt and 

t are made explicit in the following section.
4.1.1 Stochastic Volatility
The existence of stochastic volatility in the shocks of policy rules with time-varying
coecients has been documented by Davig and Leeper (2006), Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2010), Bianchi (2012) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011b), who nd that not only
switches in policy rule coecients are detectable in estimation, but also a fair amount of
6The debate on the determinacy of the solution of DSGE models with time-varying coecients has
attracted attention of the literatures in recent years, and it is still an open eld to future research (see Davig
and Leeper, 2006, 2007; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2010; Farmer et al., 2011; Cho, 2013; Foerster et al.,
2013).
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stochastic volatility.7 Hence, the distribution of the error terms in the policy rules is specied
as Rt  N(0; 2R;t) and t  N(0; 2;t), where
lnR;t = (1  R) ln R + R lnR;t 1 + RRt (43)
ln;t = (1   ) ln  +  ln;t 1 + t (44)
with R 2 [0; 1),  2 [0; 1), Rt  iidN(0; 1) and t  iidN(0; 1).
In what follows, let ht = [ln R;t; ln;t] and let the set of parameters of the stochastic
volatility processes be denoted h.
Equations (43) and (44) are added to the state-space model (39)-(42) to introduce
stochastic volatility to the specication of the policy rules with time-varying coecients.
4.1.2 Endogeneity
Since the work of Clarida et al. (2000), the estimation of monetary policy rules with
constant coecients, in particular the Taylor rule, has taken into account the endogeneity
that exists between the shocks of the policy rule and ination and output. The instrument
set used in their GMM estimation contains four lags of: ination, the output gap, the Federal
funds rate, the short-long spread, and commodity price ination.
With respect to scal policy rules with constant coecients, Li (2009) illustrates the
endogeneity/simultaneity problem that arises when estimating a scal policy rule like the
one presented in this work. In estimating a scal policy rule that reacts to contemporary
debt and the output gap, Claeys (2008) uses a set of instrumental variables in his GMM
estimation that contains lags of: the output gap, debt, unit labor costs, growth in labor
productivity, NAIRU, a broad money aggregate, a synthetic interest rate of the EURO area,
oil price index, and the SEK/DEM exchange rate.
In terms of estimating linear equations with time-varying coecients, either in the con-
ventional random-coecient or Markov-switching setups, Kim (2006) and Kim (2009) es-
tablish a Heckman-type two-stage maximum likelihood estimation technique to deal with
the endogeneity problem to yield consistent estimates of the hyper-parameters, as well as to
provide correct inferences on the time-varying coecients. Kim and Nelson (2006b) estimate
a random coecients monetary policy rule for the United States using as the set of instru-
ments four lags of: the Federal funds rate, output gap, ination, commodity price ination,
and M2 growth. In related work, Bae et al. (2011) estimate a Markov-switching coecients
monetary policy rule for the United States using as the set of instruments three lags of: the
Federal funds rate, GDP gap, ination, commodity price changes, and the spread between
the long-term bond rate and the three-month Treasury Bill rate.
The set of instruments that we use for both the monetary and the scal policy rules is
given by four lags of: ination, the output gap, government spending as proportion of GDP,
M2 growth, and commodity price ination. In a constant-coecient version of the policy
rules, the GMM estimation obtains the following results with respect to the instrument set:
(i) the J test statistics of overidentication restrictions for both of the rules do not reject the
null hypothesis that the instrument set is appropriate at the 5% level of signicance; (ii) the
7Sims and Zha (2006), on the other hand, argue that only changes in volatility can be detected in
estimation, and not changes in coecients.
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exogeneity C test statistics imply that dierent subsets of instruments are exogenous at the
5% level of signicance; (iii) the Cragg-Donald test statistics reject the null hypothesis of
weak instruments at the 5% level of signicance for both policy rules. Appendix F describes
the setup of the model to correct for endogeneity. Details on the implementation of the
Bayesian estimation of y, z, h, fzsgTs=0 and fhsgTs=0 appear in Appendix H.
4.2 Data
We use quarterly data from 1960:1 to 2008:3. The sample is not extended beyond 2008:3
to avoid having to deal with the zero lower bound (ZLB) of interest rates. It is still possible
to estimate the interdependence between monetary and scal policy under the ZLB, but that
constitutes a subject of future research. Ination is the percentage change over the last four
quarters of the price level given by the GDP price deator. The nominal interest rate is the
quarterly average of the federal funds rate. The output gap is the log dierence between real
GDP and the Congressional Budget Oce's measure of potential real GDP. M2 growth is the
percentage change over the last four quarters of seasonally adjusted M2. Commodity price
ination is the percentage change over the last four quarters of the commodity price index.
Government spending is the federal consumption expenditures and gross investment. These
variables are obtained from FRED. Lagged debt is the average debt-output ratio over the
previous four quarters, where debt is the TreasuryDirect par value of gross marketable federal
debt held by the public. Tax net of transfers corresponds to the seasonally adjusted quarterly
current receipts of the federal government from which the current transfer payments have
been deducted. This variable is obtained from the NIPA Table 3.2.
5 Estimation Results
The choice of prior distributions, hyper parameters, means of 5; 000 draws from the
posterior distribution after trimming the rst 1; 000; 000 out of 2; 000; 000 draws and thinning
every 200th draw, along with 90% condence sets appear in Table 1.8 In order to keep
the estimation relatively simple, we impose two restrictions that do not change the results
qualitatively: First, we assume that the output gap coecients of both policy rules are not
time varying, which allows us to focus on capturing the interdependence between monetary
and scal policy making in terms of the co-movement of the Taylor rule coecient of ination
and the tax rule coecient of lagged debt. Second, we assume that the location parameters
of the logistic policy rule coecients, 3 and 
b
3, are zero.
Figure 2 shows that the estimated model does acceptably well at explaining the observed
time series of interest and tax rates.
8The Raftery and Lewis (1992) diagnostic test determines that 606,826 draws from the posterior dis-
tribution should be taken to estimate the 50th percentile within 0.01 with a 95% condence level. It also
determines that thinning to achieve an independent chain should occur every 115th draw.
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Table 1: Results from the Bayesian Estimation
Prior Posterior
Parameters Density Mean SD Mean 90% Conf. Set
0 Gamma 0.8 0.2 0.57 [0.35, 0.84]
1 Gamma 1.2 0.3 1.06 [0.61, 1.68]
2 Gamma 10 8 5.05 [0.10, 15.72]
y Gamma 0.5 0.4 0.25 [0.08, 0.52]
R Beta 0.9 0.05 0.96 [0.91, 0.99]
b0 Normal -0.02 0.05 0.00 [-0.06, 0.06]
b1 Gamma 0.1 0.05 0.09 [0.03, 0.20]
b2 Gamma 10 8 4.03 [0.04, 14.70]
y Gamma 0.5 0.4 0.76 [0.44, 1.16]
 Beta 0.9 0.05 0.94 [0.93, 0.96]
zm Beta 0.9 0.05 0.86 [0.74, 0.95]
zf Beta 0.9 0.05 0.88 [0.78, 0.95]
zm0 Normal 0 2 -0.41 [-2.66, 1.93]
zf0 Normal 0 2 0.05 [-2.26, 2.35]
 | 0.20 [0.02, 0.47]
lnR | -2.05 [-2.41, -1.70]
R | 0.77 [0.63, 0.90]
R | 0.57 [0.39, 0.78]
lnR;0 | -2.93 [-5.18, -0.68]
ln | -1.15 [-1.45, -0.89]
 | 0.48 [0.27, 0.64]
 | 0.88 [0.65, 1.11]
ln;0 | -5.85 [-12.48, 0.59]
| denotes a at prior.
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Figure 2: Observed and Predicted Series
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5.1 Choice of Prior Distributions
With respect to the monetary policy rule coecients, there exist results in the literature
about the values that they take in dierent regimes. Clarida et al. (2000) estimate that
the ination coecient is 0.83 in the pre-Volcker era and 2.15 in the Volcker-Greenspan
era. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) nd that the coecient on ination is estimated at 0.77
or 0.89, depending on the prior used, in the pre-1982 era, and 2.19 in the post-1982 era.
Bianchi (2012) nds that the coecient on ination is estimated to be 0.94, 1.25, or 1.6
in a three-regime Markov-switching specication. Davig and Leeper (2011) nd that the
ination coecient switches between 0.53 and 1.29. We specify the prior distribution that
characterizes the lower bound of the ination coecient with a mean of 0.8, and the upper
bound with a prior distribution whose mean is 2 (the sum of 0.8 and 1.2 in Table 1). In
regard to the scal policy rule coecients, Bianchi (2012) nds that the coecient on debt
is estimated to be 0.0006, -0.0007, or -0.0036. Davig and Leeper (2011) estimate that the
coecient on debt switches between -0.025 and 0.071. We set the prior mean of the lower
bound of the debt coecient to -0.02, and the mean of the prior distribution that sets the
upper bound of the coecient to 0.08 (the sum of -0.02 and 0.1 in Table 1). The policy rule
coecients on the output gap for both policy rules have 0.5 as the prior mean.
The prior distribution specication of the transition coecients of both logistic policy
rule coecients is set to have a mean of 10 with a standard deviation of 8. We recall that
the larger the coecient is, the more rapid the transition between states is. Values of the
coecient greater than 10 imply a specication that mimics closely a Markov-switching-like
transition. The choice of this prior distribution allows the coecient to take low or high
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values.
The smoothing coecients of the policy rules have prior distributions that are standard
in terms of the persistence that they represent for interest and tax rates in the data.
A coecient that deserves attention is the correlation coecient between the shocks of the
latent factors, which determines the degree of interdependence between monetary and scal
policymaking. The prior distribution chosen is uniform on [0,1]. We recall that a positive
value of this parameter implies that monetary and scal policy co-move in such a way that
they tend to deliver outcomes in the M or the F regime more frequently than outcomes
in the indeterminacy or no solution regimes. Hence, by choosing a prior distribution on
the nonnegative domain, we are imposing a model with either co-movements towards the
determinate regimes or absence of co-movements in that direction, but we are not allowing
co-movements in the direction of the indeterminate or unbounded debt regimes.
Finally, following Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011a), we do not specify prior distribu-
tions for the parameters of the stochastic volatility processes.
5.2 Parameter Estimates
The estimated parameters of the monetary and scal policy rule coecients in Table
1 have the expected magnitudes and signs. In particular, for the monetary policy rule,
the ination coecient takes values in (0.57, 1.63), while the output gap coecient has a
posterior mean of 0.25. With respect to the scal policy rule, the debt coecient takes on
values in (0.001, 0.095), while the output gap coecient has a posterior mean of 0.76. The
speed of transition of the policy rule coecients is estimated to be higher for the ination
coecient of the monetary policy rule than for the debt coecient of the tax rule. This
implies that the scal authority has a slower transition across states (in terms of how taxes
react with respect to deviations of debt) than the monetary authority does (in terms of how
the interest rate reacts with respect to ination). This result is consistent with the legislative
and implementation lags of scal policymaking.
The latent factors show relatively high persistence, with the scal policy latent factor
being somewhat more persistent than the monetary policy one. This result implies that
scal policy regimes are likely to last longer than monetary policy regimes.
Finally, the correlation between the latent factors has an estimated posterior mean of 0:20
and a 90% condence set given by (0.01, 0.47). This result implies that there is a degree of
direct interactions between policies. In particular, monetary tightenings to stabilize ination
tend to be accompanied by scal policy that stabilizes debt (M regime), while scal policy
that departs from debt stabilization tends to be accompanied by interest rates that react
weakly to ination (F regime).
5.3 Evolution of Policy Rule Coecients
Figure 3 shows the smoothed estimates of the monetary policy rule coecient for ination
on the left axis, and of the scal policy rule coecient for debt on the right axis. Two facts
are apparent from this gure: First, the scal policy rule coecient on debt was low during
most of the 1970s, the second half of the 1980s, and the rst half of the 1990s. Second, the
monetary policy rule coecient on ination was high during the second half of the 1960s
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Figure 3: Evolution of Policy Rule Coecients and NBER Recession Periods
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.75
1
1.25
αpi
 
 
αpi(zm
t
)
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
γb
γb(zf
t
)
and the rst half of the 1970s, during the rst half of the 1980s, and during the rst half
of the 2000s. In the next paragraphs, we discuss the evolution of each of the policy rule
coecients to compare the econometric results with the narrative about monetary and scal
policymaking and with similar results in the literature.
The evolution of the monetary policy rule coecient on ination reveals that the Federal
Reserve conducted a hawkish monetary policy during the second half of 1960s, as Davig and
Leeper (2011), Bianchi (2010), Eo (2009) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2010) nd, with
a tendency to ease it towards the end of the decade. During the mid 1970s the interest rate
did not react strongly to ination. Most studies in the literature nd a passive monetary
policy during this decade, except Boivin (2006), who nds that monetary policy was tight
during the rst half of the 1970s. At the end of the 1970s monetary policy switched rapidly
to a hawkish regime. This switch in policymaking is also found by Davig and Doh (2009), Eo
(2009) and Bianchi (2010) who nd, based on estimations of Markov-switching policy rule
coecients, that the active monetary policy periods started around, or a little earlier than,
the mid 1980s. The graph shows that monetary policy continued to be relatively hawkish
during most of the 1980s. Starting in the late 1980s, the estimates of the model suggest
a relatively weak response to ination, which lasted through much of the 1990s. A study
that nds a similar result is Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2010).9 In 2000s, monetary policy
increased its reaction to ination until 2005 and then the strength of the reaction declined.
The empirical evidence is divided with respect to this result: On one hand Eo (2009), Davig
and Doh (2009) and Bianchi (2010) nd that monetary policy was actively ghting ination,
while on another Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2010) and Davig and Leeper (2011) nd the
9Kim and Nelson (2006a) nd that their condence interval starts including the passive monetary policy
region at the beginning of the 1990s.
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opposite.
For a narrative perspective on the results, we rely on the history of the monetary policy
of the Federal Reserve as told by Hetzel (2008). He compares Fed Chairman William Martin
to Fed Chairman Paul Volcker and Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan in that Martin believed
that raising short-term interest rates in an expansion was a way to preempt ination. That
allows to understand the behavior of monetary policy, according to the graph, during the
second half of the 1960s. Hetzel also mentions the weak reaction of interest rates to ination
during the 1970s due to the focus of the central bank to promote employment and the belief
that ination was a nonmonetary phenomenon. According to Hetzel, the 1980s saw the
commitment of the Federal Reserve to money targets allowing the FOMC to raise interest
rates by whatever extent necessary to lower ination. The results show that the reaction
coecient of the interest rate to ination was indeed relatively high.
After tightening monetary policy at the end of the 1980s to counteract concerns about
ination, the results show a decline in the reaction of the federal funds rate to ination
at the beginning of the 1990s to help with the recovery after the recession. With ination
declining during this decade and interest rates remaining nearly at, except for the rise
between 1993 and 1995 due to the \1994 ination scare" (see Hetzel, 2008), the reaction
coecient on ination declines until the events of the Asian and Russian crises. During
1998 the Federal Reserve moved the interest rate in the same direction as declining ination,
causing a spike in the evolution of the ination coecient. In the 2000s, with declining
ination and interest rates between 2001 and the beginning of 2003, the reaction coecient
to ination rises rapidly to reach a peak in the second quarter of 2003 when concerns about
interest rates being close to the zero-bound arose for the rst time. With ination stable
and interest rates rising during 2004, the reaction coecient declines. Then the coecient
rises at the end of the sample, between 2005 and 2008, reecting interest rates that risen
more than what ination risen during the period.
For the debt policy rule coecient, the results show a coecient responding weakly to
lagged debt during the 1970s, a result mostly in the same lines as those in Davig and Leeper
(2006), Bianchi (2012), and Favero and Monacelli (2003). The results also show a low debt
coecient during the second half of the 1980s and the rst half of the 1990s, a result that is
compatible with the ndings in Bianchi (2012).
In terms of the narrative, the tax reductions in the revenue act of 1964 can help un-
derstand the decline of the coecient during the 1960s, while the revenue and expenditure
control act of 1968 and the tax reform act of 1969 can help explain the rise of the coecient
at the end of the decade. The subsequent tax reforms of 1971, 1975 and 1976 help explain
the decline in the debt coecient during the 1970s. The rise of the coecient observed at
the end of the decade has to do with the fact that the debt-GDP ratio rises between 1975
and 1980, inclusive, and the net revenue-GDP ratio rose in that period. That relationship
breaks up during the 1980s due to the tax reforms of the decade, in particular the recovery
tax act of 1981. During the 1990s, the coecient rises rapidly, most likely due to the changes
implemented in the budget reconciliation act of 1993. The taxpayer relief act of 1997 can
help understand the decline in the coecient at the end of the decade. The decline of the
debt coecient in the 2000s can be attributed to the tax relief acts of 2001 and 2003, and
the subsequent stimulus acts of 2004 and 2008.
In a historical perspective, the evolution of the estimated policy rule coecients suggest
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Figure 4: Evolution of Estimated Stochastic Volatilities
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that policy leaned towards a scal regime during some part of the 1970s, a result emphasized
by Bianchi (2012). On the other hand, the estimates favored a monetary regime during the
second half of the 1960s, the rst half of the 1980s, and the rst half of the 2000s. The macroe-
conomic model allows short-run dynamics that visit temporarily all the regimes, including
the indeterminate and the no-bounded-solution regimes, but the long-run expectations of a
mixed regime imply dynamics that tend to move the economy between the two determinate
regimes.
5.4 Evolution of Estimated Stochastic Volatilities
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the estimated stochastic volatilities for the interest and
tax rate rules. The estimation shows that the volatility of interest rates was signicantly
higher during the beginning of the 1980s due to the important change in conducting monetary
policy. Also, volatility is somewhat lower starting in the 1990s, a phenomenon referred to
as the great moderation (see Stock and Watson, 2002), and stays low with a small peak at
the end of the sample period when the great recession hit. On the other hand, scal policy
volatility shows spikes in the mid 1970s, the rst half of the 2000s, and the beginning of the
great recession. All these events are associated with some kind of scal stimulus. It is worth
noting that the persistence of the volatility of monetary policymaking, given by the estimated
coecient R , is higher than the persistence of the volatility of scal policymaking, given
by the estimated coecient  , as can be seen in Table 1.
6 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Analysis
This section presents the results of monetary and scal policy experiments through
impulse-response functions. The section also presents the eect of policy interdependence in
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reducing the volatility of output and ination.
6.1 Nonlinear Impulse Response Analysis
We perform policy experiments with the model solved using the proposed solution method
and calibrated according to the estimated parameters of the policy rule coecients. Since the
estimation is not constrained to deliver a continuous solution to the macroeconomic model
as presented in Appendix E, we calibrate the model with coecients that are consistent with
continuity of the solution. In particular, we calibrate the lower bound of the monetary policy
rule coecient on ination, 0 , to be 0.85 instead of 0.57. The scal policy rule coecients,
b0 and 
b
0, are calibrated to 0.03 and 0.07 instead of 0 and 0.09, respectively.
For the markup in steady state and the price adjustment cost parameter, Keen and Wang
(2007) show that, given a steady state markup and a fraction of rms that re-optimize each
period, there is a corresponding value for the price adjustment cost parameter. We set
the markup to 20% and the fraction of re-optimizing rms to 25% each period (a rm re-
optimizes every 12 months). These values correspond, approximately, to  = 6 and  = 60.
Other parameters that need to be specied are: , the steady state gross quarterly rate of
output growth, which is set to 1:0081, the average over the sample period that implies a
steady state annual growth rate of approximately 3.25%; , the steady state gross quarterly
rate of price ination, which is set to 1:0084, the average over the sample period that implies
a steady state annual ination of approximately 3.4%; b, the steady state level of debt to
output, which is set to 0.3354, the average over the sample period; , the ratio of government
spending to output is set to 0.081, also the average over the sample period; 1=vb, the ratio
of outstanding money balances to debt, is set to 0.2 following Kim (2003);  is set to 0.99;
 is set to 1; and ' is set to 1, so that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is unity.
We perform two policy experiments. First, a one-time i.i.d shock on the interest rate.
Second, a one-time i.i.d shock on the tax-to-output ratio. The responses to these shocks are
calculated under three scenarios: starting at regime M and staying there forever, starting at
regime F and staying there forever, and a Mixed regime.
In the Mixed regime, the latent factors start at their means, which we set to zero according
to the condence sets in Table 1. These zero values imply corresponding values for the initial
monetary and scal policy rule coecients ((0) = 1:38 and b(0) = 0:065). Over the
response horizon, the policy rule coecients evolve according to their logistic specications
and the joint evolution of the latent factors. To compute the responses in the Mixed regime,
we take the average of the responses for given realizations of the policy rule coecients.
Note that in the Mixed regime the initial values of the policy rule coecients imply that the
economy is in regime M. However, because agents expect regime F to take place for some
time in the future, the dynamics of the Mixed regime are not those of a pure M regime, but
of a regime that incorporates the features of both regimes M and F.
6.1.1 A Monetary Contraction
Figure 5 shows the responses of some of the variables of the model to a one-time 25 basis
point i.i.d. shock on the interest rate.
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Figure 5: Response to a 25 bp Increase in the Interest Rate
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Figure 6: Response to a 100 bp Increase in the Tax Rate
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The eects of a monetary contraction in a New Keynesian model in regime M are well
known: an open market operation that sells debt to households, and that is expected to
be corrected in the future via higher taxes, does not change household wealth and only in-
creases the nominal interest rate. With sticky prices the real interest rate increases, reducing
consumption, output and ination. As the nominal interest rate decreases, as well as the
real interest rate, the output gap returns to zero and ination to its steady state. Taxes
rst decrease due to feedback from the output gap and then increase due to their Ricardian
response to lagged debt, which is now higher. Given the persistence of taxes, the present
value of expected future surpluses increases and slowly returns to steady state, while the
present value of expected future seignorage decreases on impact.
In regime F, an open market operation that sells debt to households, which is not expected
to be corrected in the future via higher taxes, increases household's wealth. The increase in
wealth attenuates the liquidity-induced contraction in demand. Ination drops on impact
given that the liquidity eect dominates the wealth eect.10 The real interest rate increases
on impact, causing output to fall. Note that a \price puzzle", in the sense of Sims (1992), is
present. Over the response horizon, ination increases due to some unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic: Taxes are not expected to increase to pay back the debt and some monetization
of the decit is expected. Taxes decrease on impact, reacting mainly to the output gap, and
then increase above steady state due to the initial increase in debt, since the debt coecient
of the scal policy rule is small but positive. Given the persistence of taxes, the tax increase
above steady state makes the present value of expected future surpluses increase on impact.
In the Mixed regime, agents compute their responses based on their expectation of the
evolution of future regimes. As a result, the eects of a monetary contraction on ination and
output are between the two previously described regimes. Agents' expectations incorporate
the behavior of the economy under both regimes M and F. Thus, there is lower ination on
impact and there is a wealth eect that translates into marginally higher ination in the long
run. Output also falls on impact due to higher real interest rates. These results mean that,
as long as the economy does not start at one of the limiting regimes and stays there forever,
some of the wealth eect derived from regime F will inuence the economy's response to a
monetary contraction. That is, a monetary contraction decreases ination on impact, but
the long-run eect is an increase of ination above steady state. Sims (2011) describes this
feature of monetary policy as \stepping on a rake".
The impact response of ination and output to a 25 basis points increase in the interest
rate is shown in Figure 7 for a combination of values of (zm) and b(zf ) for zm = zf in [-
10,10]. The responses of ination and output range from -1.03% and -1.37%, respectively, in
regime M (zm = zf = 10), to -0.15% and -0.42%, respectively, in regime F (zm = zf =  10).
In between these limits there exists a continuum of impact responses given by the possible
combinations of the monetary and scal policy rule coecients. Hence, the size of the impact
response of ination and output to a monetary policy shock will depend on the state of the
10To determine the direction of the initial response of ination in regime F, we use the following expression:
R 1b 1
1
0
1
Y0
= E0
1X
t=0
MRS0;t (st +mt) ;
where st and mt denote the primary surplus and seignorage, respectively, in output terms.
25
Figure 7: Response on Impact to a 25 bp Increase in the Interest Rate
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monetary and scal policy rule coecients at the time of policy implementation.
6.1.2 A Fiscal Contraction - Tax increase
Figure 6 shows the responses of some of the variables of the model to a one-time 100
basis point i.i.d shock on the tax-to-output ratio.
In regime M, a tax increase that retires debt does not have any eect on output or
ination due to the Ricardian nature of the equilibrium: higher taxes today are expected to
be fully compensated with lower taxes in the future, with no wealth eect on households.
Wealth is unchanged because, on impact, the present value of expected future surpluses and
seignorage are unchanged. Taxes decrease after impact in reaction to the reduction in debt
and, given the persistence of taxes, remain below steady state at long horizons. Debt falls,
anticipating the decrease in the present value of expected future surpluses. There are no
changes in seignorage.
A tax increase in regime F reduces wealth since the increase is not expected to be reversed
in the future. The decrease in wealth reduces demand for goods and, hence, ination. Since
the nominal interest rate responds passively to changes in ination, the real interest rate
increases, reducing consumption and output. The present value of expected future surpluses
increases due to persistently higher taxes that will not be compensated for in the future.
The present value of expected future seignorage declines on impact due to lower ination and
interest rates. Overall, the change in the expected present value of government net receipts
implies that debt initially increases before returning to steady state.
In the Mixed regime, as with the monetary contraction, agents' behavior is based on their
expectation of the evolution of future regimes. As a result, the eects of a scal contraction
are between the two previously described regimes. That is, a change in taxes has eects on
ination and output due to the wealth eect that emerges because agents do not expect the
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Figure 8: Response on Impact to a 100 bp Increase in the Tax Rate
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initial increase in taxes to be completely reversed in the future. However, the eects are
attenuated with respect to a pure F regime.
The impact response of ination and output to a 100 basis point increase in the tax-to-
output ratio is shown in Figure 8 for a combination of values of (zm) and b(zf ) for zm = zf
in [-10,10]. The responses of ination and output range from 0% and 0%, respectively, in
regime M (zm = zf = 10), to -0.71% and -0.78%, respectively, in regime F (zm = zf =  10).
In between these limits there exists a continuum of impact responses dependent on the
combinations of monetary and scal policy rule coecients. Hence, the magnitude of the
impact responses of ination and output to a scal policy shock will depend on the state of
the monetary and scal policy rule coecients at the time of policy implementation.
6.2 Policy Interdependence: Its Eects
In this section we analyze the eect of interdependence in monetary and scal policy
making as measured by a positive correlation coecient between the latent factors, . In
Section 5.2, we showed that the estimated posterior mean of the correlation coecient be-
tween the latent factors is 0.2. As mentioned previously, this value implies that monetary
tightenings to stabilize ination tend to be accompanied by scal policy that stabilizes debt
(regime M) while scal policy that deviates from debt stabilization tends to be accompanied
by a loose monetary policy that contributes to keep debt stable (regime F).
The existing literature on Markov-switching policy rule coecients assumes that inde-
pendent states drive the switches between regimes of the coecients of each policy rule. In
that sense, there are not explicit interactions between monetary and scal policymaking. In
the context of the current paper, that would be analogous to the case where  = 0.
To examine the eect of policy interdependence ( > 0), we solve and simulate the model
for dierent values of the correlation coecient between the latent factors. We simulate the
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Figure 9: Interdependence and Unconditional Volatilities of Output and In-
ation
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model for 1,000 periods 1,000 times, including the evolution of latent factors, and take the
standard deviation of output and ination.11 Figure 9 illustrates the results of the exercise
where the unconditional standard deviations have been normalized to one when  = 0, which
is the case of absence of coordination.
As can be seen from the gure, the stronger the association between monetary and scal
policymaking, as measured by the degree of synchronization of changes in the coecients of
the policy rules, the smaller the unconditional standard deviation of the series. The results
show that going from a scenario of independent switching in the coecients of the policy
rules to a scenario of relatively low interdependence, as measured by  = 0:25, would result
in a decrease of between 1% and 2% in the unconditional standard deviation of ination or
output.
To understand this result, recall that the only two determinate equilibria arise in regimes
M and F, while the other two equilibria imply either an indeterminacy or a solution with
unbounded debt. Under the indeterminate equilibrium, the presence of sunspot shocks may
imply a higher volatility of ination, whereas under the unbounded debt equilibrium there is
not a stationary solution to the macroeconomic model. Hence, policy co-movements in the
direction of the M and F regimes would help stabilize output and ination with respect to
the case of no policy co-movements or co-movements away from determinate regimes.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we formulated and solved a New Keynesian model with time-varying policy
rule coecients that allows for interdependence between monetary and scal policymaking.
This specication permits analyzing the eects of monetary and scal policy in an environ-
ment where agents expect the economy to evolve between times where the nominal anchor
is provided by monetary policymaking and times where the nominal anchor is provided by
11The standard deviation of the shocks is kept xed across simulations.
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scal policymaking.
We estimated the policy rules, and obtained results showing that there have been uctu-
ations in the monetary and scal policy rule coecients. Additionally, policymaking shows
important persistence, with scal policy being somewhat more persistent than monetary
policy. The results also show that there is a degree of policy interdependence, given by a
positive correlation coecient between the latent factors that drive the evolution of policy
rule coecients. More specically, scal policy that focuses on keeping debt under control
tends to accompany monetary policy that focuses on keeping ination under control, and
monetary policy that keeps interest rates with a low reaction to ination tends to accompany
scal policy that departs from debt stabilization.
Policy experiments show that when agents expect the economy to evolve between a regime
of monetary price determination and a regime of scal price determination, contractionary
monetary policy lowers ination in the short run and increases it in the long run. The exper-
iments reveal that (lump-sum) taxes have eects on output and ination, as the literature
on the scal theory of the price level suggests, but eects are attenuated relative to a pure
scal regime.
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Appendix
A Model Setup
The representative household solves the following problem:
max
fCt;Mt=Pt;Btg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t

(Ct=At)
1 
1   + M log
 
Mdt =Pt
  HH1+'t
1 + '

subject to
Ct +
Mdt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
+
Tt
Pt
 HtWt
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
+
Mdt 1
Pt
+Rt 1
Bt 1
Pt
for t  0;
M 1 +R 1B 1
P 1
given;
lim
t!1
MRS0;t
Mt +Bt
Pt
= 0;
where MRS0;t denotes the marginal rate of substitution between period 0 and period t. The
necessary rst order conditions are:
Ct :
1
At

Ct
At
 
  t = 0 (45)
Ht :  HH't + t
Wt
Pt
= 0 (46)
Mdt
Pt
: M

Mdt
Pt
 1
  t + Ett+1 Pt
Pt+1
= 0 (47)
Bt :  t
Pt
+ RtEt
t+1
Pt+1
= 0; (48)
t : Ct +
Mdt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
+
Tt
Pt
 HtWt
Pt
  Dt
Pt
  M
d
t 1
Pt
 Rt 1Bt 1
Pt
= 0 (49)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint at time t.
From (45) and (48),
1 = RtEt

Ct=At
Ct+1=At+1

At
At+1
Pt
Pt+1
: (50)
From (45) and (46)
HH
'
t At

Ct
At

=
Wt
Pt
: (51)
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From (45), (47) and (48),
Mt
Pt
= MAt

Ct
At
 
Rt
Rt   1

: (52)
Prots of intermediate rm j are given by
Dt(j)
Pt
=
Pt(j)
Pt
Yt(j)  Wt
Pt
Lt(j)  
2

Pt(j)
Pt 1(j)
  1
2
Yt: (53)
Substituting (8) and (9) in (53) yields
Dt(j)
Pt
=
"
Pt(j)
Pt
1 t
   t

Pt(j)
Pt
 t
  
2

Pt(j)
Pt 1(j)
  1
2#
Yt:
Then, intermediate rm j chooses Pt(j) to maximize
Et
1X
k=0
MRSt;t+k
"
Pt(j)
Pt
1 t
   t

Pt(j)
Pt
 t
  
2

Pt(j)
Pt 1(j)
  1
2#
Yt:
The rst order condition to this maximization problem is
0 = tYt
"
(1  t)

Pt(j)
Pt
 t 1
Pt
+ t
 t
Pt

Pt(j)
Pt
 t 1
  

Pt(j)
Pt 1
  1

1
Pt 1(j)
#
+
+t+1Yt+1

Pt+1(j)
Pt
  1

Pt+1(j)
Pt(j)2
: (54)
In a symmetric equilibrium, Pt(j) = Pt, Lt(j) = Lt and Yt(j) = Yt, hence
Dt(j)
Pt
=
Dt
Pt
=
"
1   t   
2

Pt
Pt 1
  1
2#
Yt: (55)
In equilibrium, Mdt = M
s
t = Mt, Bt = 0 and Ht = Lt. Then, (11), (55) and (49) imply
(12). In the symmetric equilibrium, substituting (45) into (54) yields (13). Finally, the
symmetric equilibrium yields (15), (52) is (16), and (50) is (14).
Before proceeding to the log-linearization of the model, it is convenient to write (11) in
terms of nominal output. The resulting expression is
bt = 1  1
gt
  t   1
vt
+
1
vt 1
1
t
1
Yt
+Rt 1bt 1
1
t
1
Yt
; (56)
where Yt = Yt=Yt 1.
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To obtain (17), start with (15) and recall the denition of  T = Wt=PtAt to get
 t = HL
'
t At

Ct
At

:
In the symmetric equilibrium, from (9), Yt = AtLt, and without price rigidities,  t =
t 1
t
and Ct = Yt=gt, hence
t   1
t
= H

Y t
At
'+
g t :
Once the variables have been de-trended by dividing them by At, the absence of shocks
yields (18) from (14), (21) from (16), (19) from combining (12) and (17), (20) from (19) and
ct = yt=gt, and (22) from (56) with y = .
B Matrices for Solving the Model
The matrices in system (33)-(35) are given by
G =

0 0  1= 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0  (   1)('+ )=

; J =

1 1=
0 

;
K =
  1 0
(   1)('+ )=  1

; M =

1  g 0 = 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

;
A(zt) =
2666666664
 1 0 1=(R  1) 0 0 0 0
1=vb  1 0  =b  (1=bv + 1=) 0 0
0 0  1 0 0 0  (1  R)y(zmt )
0 0 0  1 0 0  (1   )y(zft )
0 0 0 0  1  1 0
0 0 0 0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0  1
3777777775
;
B(zft ) =
2666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1=vb 1= 1= 0 0 0 0
0 0 R 0 0 0 0
0 (1   )b(zft ) 0  0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777775
;
C(zt) =
2666666664
1   0
0  (1=bv + 1=)
(1  R)y(zmt ) (1  R)(zmt )
(1   )y(zft ) 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
3777777775
;
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D =
2666666664
 0 0 0 0
1=bg 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
=('+ ) + 1=('+ ) 0 0 0 0
3777777775
;
N =
266664
g 0 0 0 0
0  0 0 0
0 0  0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
377775
C Obtaining the Coecients of the Logistic Functions
Each of the elements in the matrices P(zt);Q(zt);R(zt);S(zt) have the bivariate logistic
functional form (38), which is reproduced here for convenience and is illustrated in Figure
10:
F (zt) = F0 + F1
1
1+exp ( F2m(zmt  F3m))
1
1+exp ( F2f(zft  F3f))
1  F4 exp ( F2m(z
m
t  F3m))
1+exp ( F2m(zmt  F3m))
exp ( F2f(zft  F3f))
1+exp ( F2f(zft  F3f))
:
Figure 10: Bivariate Logistic Function
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To avoid computational costs, we nd the solutions to the coecients in R(zt) and S(zt)
only, solving for ination and output, leaving the full solution of the model to be accounted
for the structural equations of the state variables (25)-(32). Given the structure of the vector
of shocks, S(zt) is a matrix with 10 distinct elements. Given the structure of the vector of
state variables, R(zt) is a matrix with 10 distinct elements as well, although it has 14 entries.
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Therefore, in total there are 20 6 = 120 coecients of the logistic functions to be found to
obtain a solution.
C.1 Finding F0 and F1
Notice that the time-varying policy rule coecients have the following limiting combina-
tions (bounds):
zmt ! +1 zmt !  1
zft ! +1
(zmt ) = 

0 + 

1 
y(zmt ) = 
y
0 + 
y
1
b(zft ) = 
b
0 + 
b
1 
y(zft ) = 
y
0 + 
y
1
zft !  1
(zmt ) = 

0 
y(zmt ) = 
y
0
b(zft ) = 
b
0 
y(zft ) = 
y
0
Also, notice that F (zt) has the following limiting expressions:
zmt ! +1 zmt !  1
zft ! +1 F (zt) = F0 + F1
zft !  1 F (zt) = F0
To obtain F0 and F1, we solve the constant-coecient versions of the model two times
using Uhlig (1998), at the two dierent limiting combinations of the latent factors zmt and
zft . We solve for the two bounds making sure that the solutions deliver determinacy of the
equilibria at the bounds.
C.2 Finding F2m; F2f ; F3m; F3f
Substitute (36)-(37) in (33)-(35) to obtainh
A(zt)P(zt) +C(zt)R(zt) +B(z
f
t )
i
kt 1 + [A(zt)Q(zt) +C(zt)S(zt) +D]ut = 0;
J R(zt) +G

P(zt) +KR(zt)
	
kt 1 +

J R(zt) +G

Q(zt) + JS(zt)N+KS(zt) +M
	
ut = 0;
where R(zt)  EtR(zt+1) and S(zt)  EtS(zt+1). By the undetermined coecients method,
we have
A(zt)P(zt) +C(zt)R(zt) +B(z
f
t ) = 0
A(zt)Q(zt) +C(zt)S(zt) +D = 0
J R(zt) +G

P(zt) +KR(zt) = 0
J R(zt) +G

Q(zt) + JS(zt)N+KS(zt) +M = 0:
Then, solving for R(zt) and S(zt), we have
[K+ [G+ J R(zt)][ A(zt)] 1C(zt)]R(zt) =  [G+ J R(zt)][ A(zt)] 1B(zft )
[K+ [G+ J R(zt)][ A(zt)] 1C(zt)]S(zt) =  JS(zt)N M  [G+ J R(zt)][ A(zt)] 1D:
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Let
T(zt)  K+ [G+ J R(zt)][ A(zt)] 1C(zt) (57)
U(zt)   [G+ J R(zt)][ A(zt)] 1B(zft ) (58)
V(zt)   JS(zt)N M  [G+ J R(zt)][ A(zt)] 1D: (59)
Then, using the relevant elements of R(zt) and S(zt), we can write
T(zt) 0
0 T(zt)
 
R(zt)
S(zt)

=

U(zt)
V(zt)

: (60)
Given F0, F1 and F4, F (zt) takes the following expressions that include F2m, F2f , F3m
and F3f :
 lim
zft!1
F (0; zft ) = F0 +
F1
1 + exp(F2mF3m)
 lim
zmt !1
F (zmt ; 0) = F0 +
F1
1 + exp(F2fF3f )
 @
@zmt
F (zmt ; 0)jzmt =0 = gm (F1; F2m; F3m; F2f ; F3f ; F4)
 @
@zft
F (zmt ; 0)jzft =0 = gf (F1; F2m; F3m; F2f ; F3f ; F4),
where gm() and gf () are nonlinear functions of their respective arguments.
Then, to nd F2m; F2f ; F3m and F3f we solve the following system of equations for the
relevant elements of R(zt) and S(zt):264 limzft!1T(0; z
f
t ) 0
0 lim
zft!1
T(0; zft )
375
264 limzft!1R(0; z
f
t )
lim
zft!1
S(0; zft )
375 =
264 limzft!1U(0; z
f
t )
lim
zft!1
V(0; zft )
375 ;
24 limzmt !1T(zmt ; 0) 0
0 lim
zmt !1
T(zmt ; 0)
3524 limzmt !1R(zmt ; 0)
lim
zmt !1
S(zmt ; 0)
35 =
24 limzmt !1U(zmt ; 0)
lim
zmt !1
V(zmt ; 0)
35 ;
264
@
@zmt
T(zmt ; 0)jzmt =0 0
0
@
@zmt
T(zmt ; 0)jzmt =0
375R(0; 0)
S(0; 0)

+
+

T(0; 0) 0
0 T(0; 0)
264
@
@zmt
R(zmt ; 0)jzmt =0
@
@zmt
S(zmt ; 0)jzmt =0
375 =
35
=264
@
@zmt
U(zmt ; 0)jzmt =0
@
@zmt
V(zmt ; 0)jzmt =0
375 ;
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@
@zft
T(0; zft )

zft =0
0
0
@
@zft
T(0; zft )

zft =0
3775R(0; 0)S(0; 0)

+
+

T(0; 0) 0
0 T(0; 0)
2664
@
@zft
R(0; zft )

zft =0
@
@zft
S(0; zft )

zft =0
3775 =
=
2664
@
@zft
U(0; zft )

zft =0
@
@zft
V(0; zft )

zft =0
;
3775 ;
where
lim
zft!+1
A(0; zft ) =
26666666664
 1 0 1=(R  1) 0 0 0 0
1=vb  1 0  =b  (1=v + 1=) 0 0
0 0  1 0 0 0  (1  R)

y0 +
y1
1+exp(y2
y
3)

0 0 0  1 0 0  (1   )(y0 + y1 )
0 0 0 0  1  1 0
0 0 0 0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0  1
37777777775
lim
zmt !+1
A(zmt ; 0) =
26666666664
 1 0 1=(R  1) 0 0 0 0
1=vb  1 0  =b  (1=v + 1=) 0 0
0 0  1 0 0 0  (1  R)(y0 + y1)
0 0 0  1 0 0  (1   )

y0 +
y1
1+exp(y2 
y
3 )

0 0 0 0  1  1 0
0 0 0 0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0  1
37777777775
lim
zft!+1
C(0; zft ) =
26666666664
1   0
0  (1=v + 1=)
(1  R)

y0 +
y1
1+exp(y2
y
3)

(1  R)

0 +
1
1+exp(2

3 )

(1   )(y0 + y1 ) 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
37777777775
;
lim
zft!+1
C(zmt ; 0) =
26666666664
1   0
0  (1=v + 1=)
(1  R) (y0 + y1) (1  R) (0 + 1 )
(1   )

y0 +
y1
1+exp(y2 
y
3 )

0
1 0
0 0
0 0
37777777775
;
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B(0) =
26666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1=v 1= 1= 0 0 0 0
0 0 R 0 0 0 0
0 (1   )

b0 +
b1
1+exp(b2
b
3)

0  0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37777777775
;
lim
zft!+1
B(zft ) =
2666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 1=v 1= 1= 0 0 0 0
0 0 R 0 0 0 0
0 (1   )
 
b0 + 
b
1

0  0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777775
:
@
@zmt
A(zmt ; 0)jzmt =0 =
2666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0  (1  R)
y
1
y
2 exp(
y
2
y
3)
(1+exp(y2
y
3))
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777775
@
@zmt
C(zmt ; 0)jzmt =0 =
2666666664
0 0
0 0
(1  R)
y
1
y
2 exp(
y
2
y
3)
(1+exp(y2
y
3))
2 (1  R)

1

2 exp(

2

3 )
(1+exp(2

3 ))
2
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
3777777775
@
@zft
B(zft )

zft =0
=
2666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 (1   ) 12 exp(23)(1+exp(23))2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777775
:
C.3 Finding F4
Given F0; F1; F2m; F2f ; F3m and F3f , we have the following expression that includes F4:
F (0) = F0 + F1
1
1+exp(F2mF3m)
1
1+exp(F2fF3f)
1  F4 exp(F2mF3m)
1+exp(F2mF3m)
exp(F2fF3f)
1+exp(F2fF3f)
Then, to nd F4 we solve the following system of equations:
T(0) 0
0 T(0)
 
R(0)
S(0)

=

U(0)
V(0)

:
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D Computation of R(zt) and S(zt)
To obtain EtR(zt+1) and EtS(zt+1) we perform a second order Taylor expansion to
F (zt+1) = F (z
m
t+1; z
f
t+1)
= F (zmz
m
t + 
m
t+1; zf z
f
t + 
f
t+1)
around mt+1 = 
f
t+1 = 0 as follows:
F (zmt+1; z
f
t+1)  F (zmzmt ; zf zft ) + Fm(zmzmt ; zf zft )mt+1 + Ff (zmzmt ; zf zft )ft+1+
+ 0:5Fmm(zmz
m
t ; zf z
f
t )(
m
t+1)
2 + 0:5Fff (zmz
m
t ; zf z
f
t )(
f
t+1)
2+
+ Fmf (zmz
m
t ; zf z
f
t )
m
t+1
f
t+1;
where Fi() and Fij() denote the partial derivative of F () with respect to i and the par-
tial derivative of F () with respect to i rst and then with respect to j, for j = m; f ,
respectively.
Then, taking expectation conditional to zmt and z
f
t , we get
E

F (zmt+1; z
f
t+1)jzmt ; zft

 F (zmzmt ; zf zft )+
+ 0:5Fmm(zmz
m
t ; zf z
f
t ) + 0:5Fff (zmz
m
t ; zf z
f
t )+
+ Fmf (zmz
m
t ; zf z
f
t ):
Notice that the expectation of the coecient matrices involves , the correlation coe-
cient between the latent factors that drive the evolution of the monetary and scal policy
rule coecients. When taking expectations, the agents of the model incorporate the degree
of interdependence in policymaking.
E Verifying the Guessed Functional Form
Having obtained the coecients of the logistic functions that characterize the solution,
it is necessary to verify that the guessed functional forms for R(zt) and S(zt) are indeed
logistic. Recall the system of equations in (60):
T(zt) 0
0 T(zt)
 
R(zt)
S(zt)

=

U(zt)
V(zt)

:
Notice that if both zmt and z
f
t were white noise processes, then both R(zt) and S(zt)
would be constant matrices. In that case, if the coecients on the output gap of both policy
rules were constant, T() in (57) would be a function of zmt only through C(zmt ), U() in (58)
would be a function of zft only through B(z
f
t ), and V() would be constant. This implies
that some of the elements of R() are bivariate logistic functions, and that all the elements
of S() are univariate logistic functions that depend on zmt . In particular, only the entries
in the second column of R(), those that relate the behavior of ination and the output
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gap with the evolution of lagged debt, depend on both zmt and z
f
t ; all the other elements
are univariate logistic functions dependent on zmt . Hence, in the absence of persistence in
the latent factors, it is easy to show that the solution matrices follow indeed bivariate (or
univariate) logistic functions. It can be shown that the same argument holds if the policy
rule coecients on the output gap are time varying.
In any case, however, and in particular when the latent factors are persistent, the solution
has to be such that in (60) we do not `divide by zero'. The issue has to do with the fact
that since the transition between states is continuous, as opposed to the Markov-switching
setup of policy rule coecients, for some values of zt there may exist a discontinuity in the
solution. To see this, consider the simple Fisherian model:
Rt = Ett+1 + ut
Rt = (zt)t
ut+1 = uut + "t+1; "t  iid N(0; ); juj < 1
zt+1 = zzt + t+1; t  iid N(0; 1); 0  z  1
zt?us 8s; t
(zt) = 0 +
1
1 + exp ( 2zt) ;
where the notation is the same as in the new Keynesian model, since this is a particular
version of the model presented in the paper.
We guess that the fundamental solution is given by
t = a(zt)ut;
where
a(zt) = a0 +
a1
1 + exp ( a2(zt   a3)) :
Solving for a(zt), we have
uEta(zt+1) + 1
(zt)
= a(zt):
Performing a rst-order Taylor expansion to a(zt+1) around t+1 = 0, we get
a(zt) = a(zzt) = a0 +
a1
1 + exp ( a2(zzt   a3))
If z = 1, it is easy to see that
a(zt) =
1
(zt)  u :
Hence, for the solution to be logistic |and continuous, we need (zt) > u 8zt, which is
the same as 0 > u, given the monotonicity of (zt).
To derive the analogous condition in the more general case of the model presented in the
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paper, rewrite (60) for S(zt) ignoring the last two terms of (59), as follows:
T(zt)S(zt) =  JS(zt)N;
which can be rewritten as
(I5 
T(zt)) vec (S(zt)) =  
 
N> 
 J vec  S(zt) :
Hence, a sucient condition for the continuity of the solution is that each of the elements
of   (I5 
T( 1)) is greater than the corresponding element of
 
N> 
 J.
F Endogeneity Setup
Let GSPt be the demeaned government spending to output ratio in period t, M2Gt the
annual rate of growth of M2 in period t, and CMPt commodity price ination. In order to
account for the existence of endogeneity, the observation equations (39)-(40) of the state-
space model have to be modied by introducing a system of simultaneous equations. To that
end, let
y1;t = INTt;
y2;t = TAXt;
x1;t = [INFt;GAPt];
x2;t = [DBTt 1;GAPt];
(zmt ) = [
(zmt ); 
y(zmt )]
0;
(zft ) = [
b(zft ); 
y(zft )]
0;
w1;t = [fINFt sg4s=1; fGAPt sg4s=1; fGSPt sg4s=1; fM2Gt sg4s=1; fCMPt sg4s=1];
w2;t = [DBTt 1; fINFt sg4s=1; fGAPt sg4s=1; fGSPt sg4s=1; fM2Gt sg4s=1; fCMPt sg4s=1]:
Hence, conditional on zt, the state-space model (39)-(44) can be divided into two models:
one for the interest rate equation, and another for the tax rate equation. The observation
equations of each of the models are:
y1;t = Ry1;t 1 + (1  R)x1;t(zmt ) + Rt (61)
x1;t = w1;t1 + v1;t; (62)
and
y2;t = y2;t 1 + (1   )x2;t(zft ) + t (63)
x2;t = w2;t2 + v2;t: (64)
Here, 1 and 2 are conformable parameter matrices, and vi;t  iid N(0;	i) for i = 1; 2.
We introduce endogeneity in (61)-(62) and (63)-(64) by specifying
Rt = v1;t1 + e
R
t ;
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t = v2;t2 + e

t ;
where jt = j;t
j
t for j = R;  , and
eRt jy1;t 1;v1;t  iid N (0; 1  01	11) ;
et jy2;t 1;v2;t  iid N (0; 1  02	22) :
Let yt = [y1;t; y2;t]
0 and Yt = fysgts=1. Appendix G shows how to obtain the conditional
likelihood function of YT .
G The Likelihood Function of the Model with Endo-
geneity, Time-Varying Coecients and Stochastic
Volatility
Notice that the joint density function of yi;t and vi;t, conditional on yi;t 1, for i = 1; 2, and
the latent factors and stochastic volatility (these last two omitted from the density functions
below) can be written as
p (yi;t;vi;tjyi;t 1;yi ;vi) = py (yi;tjyi;t 1;vi;t;yi ;vi) pv(vi;tjvi)
= py (yi;tjyi;t 1;xi;t;vi;t;yi ;xi) px(xi;tjwi;t;xi);
where vi for i = 1; 2 is the set of parameters fi;i;	ig. Adding the conditionality on
latent factors and stochastic volatility,
y1;tjy1;t 1;x1;t;v1;t; zmt ; R;t;y1 ;x1  N
 
Ry1;t 1 + (1  R)x1;t(zmt ) + R;t
 
v1;t1 + e
R
t

; 1  01	11

y2;tjy2;t 1;x2;t;v2;t; zft ; ;t;y2 ;x2  N

y2;t 1 + (1   )x2;t(zft ) + ;t (v2;t2 + et ) ; 1  02	22

xi;tjwi;t;xi  N (wi;ti;	i) ; for i = 1; 2:
Let Yi;t = fyi;sgts=1, for i = 1; 2 and let Xi;t and Vi;t be dened in a similar fashion. Let
Zk;t = fzksgts=1 for k = m; f and let Hj;t = fj;sgts=1 for j = R;  . Then, the conditional
log-likelihood functions ofY1;T givenY1;T 1, X1;t, V1;t, Zm;t, HR;t, and ofY2;T givenY2;T 1,
X2;t, V2;t, Zf;t, H;t are, respectively,
L1;T

y1(^x1)

=
TX
t=1
l1;t

y1(^x1)

;
L2;T

y2(^x2)

=
TX
t=1
l2;t

y2(^x2)

;
where
^xi = max
xi
TX
t=1
log (px(xi;tjwi;t;xi))
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is the maximum likelihood estimator of xi for i = 1; 2, and
l1;t

y1(^x1)

= log

py

y1;tjy1;t 1;x1;t;v1;t; zmt ; R;t;y1 ; ^x1

;
l2;t

y2(^x2)

= log

py

y2;tjy2;t 1;x2;t;v2;t; zft ; ;t;y2 ; ^x2

:
This is the two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimation procedure suggested by
Vuong (1984). Let Xt = [2i=1Xi;t, and let Vt be dened in a similar way. Let Zt = fzsgts=1
and Ht = fhsgts=1. The log-likelihood function of YT given YT 1;XT ;VT ;ZT ;HT is
LT

y(^x)

=
TX
t=1
lt

y(^x)

;
where
lt

y(^x)

= l1;t

y1(^x1)

+ l2;t

y2(^x2)

;
and ^x = ^x1 [ ^x2 , y = y1 [y2 .
H Bayesian Estimation
The method presented here extends the estimation method implemented in Geweke and
Tanizaki (2001) by allowing endogeneity. Let py(ytjXt;Vt;Zt;Ht;y) denote the conditional
density of yt given Xt, Vt, Zt, Ht and y. Let pz(ztjzt 1;z) denote the conditional density
of zt given zt 1 and z. Let ph(htjht 1;h) denote the conditional density of ht given ht 1
and h. Dene Z

t+1 = fzsgTs=t+1 and Ht+1 = fhsgTs=t+1. Under this setup, the joint density
of ZT , HT and YT given XT , Vt, z, h and y is given by
p(ZT ;HT ;YT jXT ;VT ;z ;h;y) = pz(ZT jXT ;VT ;z)ph(HT jXT ;VT ;ZT ;h)py(YT jXT ;VT ;ZT ;HT ;y)
= pz(ZT jz)ph(HT jh)py(YT jXT ;VT ;ZT ;HT ;y);
where the last equality follows from the Markov property of fzsgts=0 and fhsgts=0. Then, if
z0 and h0 are assumed to be stochastic,
pz(ZT jz) = pz(z0jz)
TY
t=1
pz(ztjzt 1;z);
ph(HT jh) = ph(h0jh)
TY
t=1
ph(htjht 1;h);
py(YT jXT ;VT ;ZT ;HT ;y) =
TY
t=1
py(ytjXt;Vt;Zt;Ht;y);
p(ztjZt 1;Zt+1;YT ;XT ;VT ;HT ;y;z;h) / (65)
42
(
py(ytjXt;Vt;Zt;Ht;y)pz(ztjzt 1;z)pz(zt+1jzt;z); if t  T   1
py(ytjXt;Vt;Zt;Ht;y)pz(ztjzt 1;z); if t = T;
p(htjHt 1;Ht+1;YT ;XT ;VT ;ZT ;y;z;h) / (66)(
py(ytjXt;Vt;Zt;Ht;y)ph(htjht 1;h)ph(ht+1jht;h); if t  T   1
py(ytjXt;Vt;Zt;Ht;y)ph(htjht 1;h); if t = T;
p(yjYT ;XT ;VT ;ZT ;HT ;z;h) / py(YT jXT ;ZT ;HT ;y)py(y); (67)
p(zjYT ;XT ;VT ;ZT ;y;h) / pz(ZT jz)pz(z); (68)
p(hjYT ;XT ;VT ;HT ;y;z) / ph(HT jh)ph(h); (69)
where py(y), pz(z) and ph(h) are the prior densities of y, z and h, respectively.
From the posterior densities (67)-(69), the smoothing random draws are generated as
follows:
Step 0. Take appropriate initial values for y, z, fztgTt=0, h and fhtgTt=0, and x ^i,
	^i for i=1,2.
12
Step 1. Generate a random draw of zt from p(ztjZt 1;Zt+1;YT ;XT ;VT ;HT ;y;z;h)
for t = 1; 2; : : : ; T . Draw z
(i)
t using the normal proposal density
z
(i)
t  N(z(i 1)t ; cKzt )
where Kzt is the ltered variance-covariance matrix of the random coecients of a
random-coecient specication of the policy rules, and c is a proper scale coecient.
The algorithm accepts z
(i)
t with probability r:
r = min
8<: p

z
(i)
t jZ(i 1)t 1 ;Z(i 1)t+1 ;YT ;XT ;VT ;H(i 1)T ;(i 1)y ;(i 1)z ;(i 1)h

p

z
(i 1)
t jZ(i 1)t 1 ;Z(i 1)t+1 ;YT ;XT ;VT ;H(i 1)T ;(i 1)y ;(i 1)z ;(i 1)h
 ; 1
9=; :
Step 2. Generate a random draw of y from p(yjYT ;XT ;VT ;ZT ;HT ;z;h).
(a) Partition y1 = y1:1 [y1:2 [y1:3 , where y1:1 = f0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 , y0; y1; y2; y3g,
y1:2 = R and y1:3 = 1. Partition y2 = y2:1 [ y2:2 [ y2:3 , where y2:1 =
fb0; b1; b2; b3; y0 ; y1 ; y2 ; y3g, y2:2 =  and y2:3 = 2.
12The initial latent factors, fztgTt=0, are smoothed estimates of a random coecients model of the policy
rules with constant volatility. The initial volatility processes, fhtgTt=0, are smoothed estimates of a stochastic
volatility model of the policy rules with constant coecients. The initial values of the parameters of the
policy rules, y, are obtained from the maximization of the likelihood function given the initial processes for
the latent factors and stochastic volatilities. The initial values for z come from a least-squares regression
of current against lagged initial latent factors. The initial values for h come from a least-squares regression
of current against lagged initial log stochastic volatilities.
^i and 	^i for i = 1; 2 are the least squares estimates of the parameters in equations (62) and (64), respec-
tively.
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(b) Generate a random draw of 
(i)
y1 sequentially, as follows:
i. Generate a random draw of a transformation of 
(i)
y1:1 , ~
(i)
y1:1 , using the normal
proposal density
~(i)y1:1  N( ~(i 1)y1:1 ; cS1:1);
where S1:1 is the variance-covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood esti-
mator of ~y1:1 given the initial latent factors and stochastic volatilities, and
c is a scale coecient. The algorithm accepts iy1:1 with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
y1:1 [(i 1)y1:2 [(i 1)y1:3 jY1;T ;X1;T ;V1;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h

p


(i 1)
y1:1 [(i 1)y1:2 [(i 1)y1:3 jY1;T ;X1;T ;V1;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h
 ; 1
9=; :
ii. Generate a random draw of a transformation of 
(i)
y1:2 , ~
(i)
y1:2 , using the normal
proposal density
~(i)y1:2  N( ~(i)y1:2 ; cS1:2)
where S1:2 is the variance-covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood esti-
mator of ~y1:2 given the initial latent factors and stochastic volatilities, and
c is a scale coecient. The algorithm accepts 
(i)
y1:2 with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
y1:1 [(i)y1:2 [(i 1)y1:3 jY1;T ;X1;T ;V1;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h

p


(i)
y1:1 [(i 1)y1:2 [(i 1)y1:3 jY1;T ;X1;T ;V1;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h
 ; 1
9=; :
iii. Generate a random draw of 
(i)
y1:3 using the normal proposal density
(i)y1:3  N(^y1:3 ; S1:3)
where ^y1:3 is the least squares estimator of y1:3 using the residuals of least
squares estimations of (61) and (62), and S1:3 is its least squares estimated
variance-convariance matrix. The algorithm accepts 
(i)
y1:3 with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
y1:1 [(i)y1:2 [(i)y1:3 jY1;T ;X1;T ;V1;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h

p


(i)
y1:1 [(i)y1:2 [(i 1)y1:3 jY1;T ;X1;T ;V1;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h
 g((i 1)y1:3 )
g(
(i)
y1:3 )
; 1
9=; ;
where g() is the proposal density.
(c) Generate a random draw of 
(i)
y2 sequentially, as follows:
i. Generate a random draw of a transformation of 
(i)
y2:1 , ~
(i)
y2:1 , using the normal
proposal density
~(i)y2:1  N( ~(i 1)y2:1 ; cS2:1);
where S2:1 is the variance-covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood esti-
mator of ~y2:1 given the initial latent factors and stochastic volatilities, and
c is a scale coecient. The algorithm accepts 
(i)
y2:1 with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
y2:1 [(i 1)y2:2 [(i 1)y2:3 jY2;T ;X2;T ;V2;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h

p


(i 1)
y2:1 [(i 1)y2:2 [(i 1)y2:3 jY2;T ;X2;T ;V2;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h
 ; 1
9=; :
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ii. Generate a random draw of a transformation of 
(i)
y2:2 , ~
(i)
y2:2 , using the normal
proposal density
~(i)y2:2  N( ~(i)y2:2 ; cS2:2)
where S2:2 is the variance-covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood esti-
mator of ~y2:2 given the initial latent factors and stochastic volatilities, and
c is a scale coecient. The algorithm accepts 
(i)
y2:2 with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
y2:1 [(i)y2:2 [(i 1)y2:3 jY2;T ;X2;T ;V2;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h

p


(i)
y2:1 [(i 1)y2:2 [(i 1)y2:3 jY2;T ;X2;T ;V2;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h
 ; 1
9=; :
iii. Generate a random draw of 
(i)
y2:3 using the normal proposal density
(i)y2:3  N(^y2:3 ; S2:3)
where ^y2:3 is the least squares estimator of y2:3 using the residuals of least
squares estimations of (63) and (64), and S2:3 is its least squares estimated
variance-convariance matrix. The algorithm accepts 
(i)
y2:3 with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
y2:1 [(i)y2:2 [(i)y2:3 jY2;T ;X2;T ;V2;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h

p


(i)
y2:1 [(i)y2:2 [(i 1)y2:3 jY2;T ;X2;T ;V2;T ;Z(i)T ;H
(i 1)
T ;
(i 1)
z ;
(i 1)
h
 g((i 1)y2:3 )
g(
(i)
y2:3 )
; 1
9=; ;
where g() is the proposal density.
Step 3. Generate a random draw of ht from p(htjHt 1;Ht+1;YT ;XT ;VT ;ZT ;y;z;h)
for t = 1; 2; : : : ; T . Draw h
(i)
t using the normal proposal density
h
(i)
t  N(h(i 1)t ; cKht )
where Kht is the ltered variance-covariance matrix of the volatility of a constant-
coecient specication of the policy rules, and c is a proper scale coecient. The
algorithm accepts h
(i)
t with probability r:
r = min
8<: p

h
(i)
t jH(i 1)t 1 ;H(i 1)t+1 ;YT ;XT ;VT ;Z(i)T ;(i)y ;(i 1)z ;(i 1)h

p

h
(i 1)
t jH(i 1)t 1 ;H(i 1)t+1 ;YT ;XT ;VT ;Z(i)T ;(i)y ;(i 1)z ;(i 1)h
 ; 1
9=; :
Step 4. Generate a random draw of z from p(zjYT ;XT ;VT ;ZT ;y;h) sequentially,
as follows:
(a) Partition z = z1 [z2 where z1 = fzm ; zfg and z2 = fg.
(b) Generate a random draw f(i)zm ; (i)zf g using two independent Beta proposal densities
(expressed in terms of means and standard deviations)

(i)
zm  Beta(^zm ; ^^zm )

(i)
zf
 Beta(^zm ; ^^
zf
);
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where ^zm is the ordinary least squares estimate of zm in (41) using fzm(i)t gTt=1,
and ^^zm is its standard error. The same applies for ^zf and ^^zf , which come
from the estimation of (42) using fzf(i)t gTt=1. The algorithm accepts f(i)zm ; (i)zf g
with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
z1 [(i 1)z2 jYT ;XT ;VT ;Z(i)T ;y;h

p


(i 1)
z1 [(i 1)z2 jYT ;XT ;VT ;Z(i)T ;y;h
 g((i 1)zm ; (i 1)zf )
g(
(i)
zm ; 
(i)
zf
)
; 1
9=; :
(c) Generate a random draw (i) using a four-parameter Beta proposal density with
range on [-1,1] (expressed in terms of mean and standard deviation)
(i)  TransformedBeta(^; (1  ^2)=pn  1);
where ^ is the correlation coecient between the residuals of equations (41) and
(42) using 
(i)
zm and 
(i)
zf
as estimated coecients where corresponds. The algorithm
accepts (i) with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
z1 [(i)z2 jYT ;XT ;VT ;Z(i)T ;y;h

p


(i)
z1 [(i 1)z2 jYT ;XT ;VT ;Z(i)T ;y;h
 g((i 1))
g((i))
; 1
9=; :
Step 5. Generate a random draw of h from p(hjYT ;XT ;VT ;HT ;y;z).
(a) Partition h = h1[h2 where h1 = flnR; R ; ln ; g and h2 = fR; g.
(b) Generate a random draw fln(i)R ; (i)R ; ln(i) ; (i)g using the independent proposal
densities (expressed in terms of means and standard deviations)
(i)R  Beta(^R ; ^^R )
(i)  Beta(^ ; ^^ )
c
(i)
R  N (c^R; ^cR)
c(i)  N (c^ ; ^c ) ;
with ln 
(i)
R = c
(i)
R =(1   (i)R) and ln (i) = c(i) =(1   (i) ), where c^R; ^R are the
least squares estimates of (1   R) ln R and R in (43), respectively, using
fln(i)R;tgTt=0, and where c^ ; ^ are obtained similarly from (44) using fln(i);tgTt=0.
The algorithm accepts fln(i)R ; (i)R ; ln(i) ; (i)g with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
h1 [(i 1)h2 jYT ;XT ;VT ;H(i)T ;y;z

p


(i 1)
h1 [(i 1)h2 jYT ;XT ;VT ;H(i)T ;y;z
 g(ln(i 1)R ; (i 1)R ; ln(i 1) ; (i 1) )
g(ln
(i)
R ; 
(i)
R ; ln
(i)
 ; 
(i)
 )
; 1
9=; :
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(c) Generate a random draw f(i)R ; (i) g using the inverted gamma proposal densities

(i)
R  IG(~0
R(i)~R(i); df)
(i)  IG(~0
(i)~(i); df);
where ~
R(i)
t = ln 
(i)
R;t   (1   (i)R) ln (i)R   (i)R ln(i)R;t 1 and ~(i)t = ln (i);t   (1  

(i)
 ) ln 
(i)
   (i) ln(i);t 1 are residuals, and ~R(i) and ~(i) are vectors that stack
the respective residuals. The algorithm accepts f(i)R ; (i) g with probability r:
r = min
8<: p


(i)
h1 [(i)h2jYT ;XT ;VT ;H(i)T ;y;z

p


(i)
h1 [(i 1)h2 jYT ;XT ;VT ;H(i)T ;y;z
 g((i 1)R ; (i 1) )
g(
(i)
R ; 
(i)
 )
; 1
9=; :
Step 6. Repeat steps 1-4 N times to obtain N random draws of ZT , HT , y, z and
h.
In steps (ii)-(vi) the random draws of Z, H, y, z and h are updated. This sampling
method is referred to as the Gibbs sampler. To generate the random draws of zt, ht for
t = 1; 2; : : : ; T , y, z and h, we use the Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm. That is,
the Gibbs sampler and the M-H algorithm are combined to obtain the smoothing random
draws from the state-space model.
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